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This paper is concerned with the various factors in~olved in Yne marketing of maize 
at a particular period of transfornation in the colonial agriculture of South Africa. 
The greatest structural obstacles to commercial farmhg -- Yne sheer inrmobility of 
produce, the sluggishness and inelasticity of marketing mechanics, the geographical 
and seasonal unevenness of supply, the annual cycle of hi&% and low prices - had to 
be overcome if agriculture was to be capitalized. Nore importmtly, credit and 
capital had to be made available if the agricxltural sector was to break out of the 
illiquidity trap which so severely turned ths terns of trade against it. And these 
problems involved relationships of excllange mtX agezcies of distribution rafher than 
methods of production. It is largely with these pracasses that *is paper is 
concerned. So we are looking at a system in transition from the we& market- 
orientation of grain-fanning of t h e  nineteenth cerakry to -the higllly regalate8 bulk: 
marketing of the tlxentieta. It was only towrd the end of the nineteenth centmy and 
particularly after the Angle-Boer war fnat the growiw of crops for sale became a 
centcsl part of many Higkveld famersl productive activitiss. From the mid-1920s the 
anarchy of the unchecked market was b~.o.@t under control by tlie centralized 
organization of maize mxketing, bx %.he erection of grain elevators in the p-codwiv-~~; 
districts, and the developmsnt of co-operati-re societies. llhe peziod in between was 
a time of glut and famine, of great vaxlationa in price, of ~ L Z C ~  intermittest, smll- 
scale dabbling in pr~duce markets, of sudden gains and sadden losses. It was pre- 
eminently the age of the spec-dator, whose profit depended on his ability to forecast 
crop yields, gaw price movements, and fulfil mbitioas oontracta to deliver. It was 
also a period in which greatly eqcmded crap pcodactio3 induced the opening up of new 
markets - internally and overseas - and greatly stimulated agitation against the 
tyrannous stranglehold of finance capital. (1) 
In the post-war years, the decimation of the Higbveld stock population meant 
that the farmer was obliged to rely on c~lltivation for an income. In order to re- 
establish himself on the land, t;?e f a m r  was in rnany cases obliged mortgage his 
land or entec some otiier fom of indebtedness. Then, having acquired a few oxen, 
implements and seed, he had to rely heaxily on marketing a crop in order to repw his 
debts and recapitalize his fam. Bailway construction was very impostant to fanners, 
for,without access to markets, grain was unsaleable. The greatly expanded railway 
construction in arable districts after the war penaitted vastly increased acreages to 
be ploughed and sown. Limited access to marketa for w i n  meant that there was a low 
ceiling above which cultivation of the land was wasted effort and wasted expense. 
The coming of railways could, and usually did, revolutio~.lize land use and the 
intensity of exploitation of the land. Whereas the limits of exploitability in stock 
husbandry axe much narrower without fairly heavy capitalization, crop cultivation, on 
the other hand, could be expanded ealormously without any lare-scale, long-term capital 
investment. 
Railways also meant tha t  famers could survive economioally on smaller 
fams,  and that land sub-division could pracesd beyond thg stage which h d  previouly  
been the limit of viabi l i ty .  From Frankfort i n  1908: 
Owing to  the sub-division of the pmpezties the f a m s  
are becoming so limited i n  extent that  the owners are 
forced t o  depend on The prodnction of cereals and, 
- unless they have other transport than the afi.irla.rf 
'ox-wagon', t h e i r  inems of existence w i l l  be 
exceedingly precarious. (2) 
Thus, as farms got smaller, the land was ever more intensively cultivated, and the 
pro-portion of land put the plough increased. 
Railwws, however, tended to  replace local gluts xste:~l t ing from immobility 
with gluts  i n  the major markets, as  new ara.bPa di.st,ricts were opened up and as more 
and more land was turned t o  cultivation as  a result .  So "the mo-re railways that  were 
bu i l t ,  the more flooded mrkets  were l ike ly  to  become. O f  course, there was no% osre- 
production in any. absolute sense. Glutting teided to  be seasonal and regiollal, given 
-ke  bottlenecks i n  the marketing systein. While the aaize regions were 0ve.r-al~pglied, 
other regions were importing from oversea. hJkLile surpluses could not be drained i n  
Heilbron, shortages could not be made good i n  Jagersfontein. But a s i t l n t ion  i n  
which ttio-t-Mrds of tlia 1904 maize crop i n  the ORC was s t f  l1 unsold a year a f t e r  
hamresting was clearly unsatisfactory to  prodi~cers. In 1907, higber prices on world 
markets than had ruled f o r  r n q  years, together with a -per maize crop internally, 
gave So-ath African producers the opportcmity to  break into the vorld market. 
Agreements between the South African authori.t;iss a d  the Confer~fize shipping l ines  
resulted i n  special low freight ra tes  f o r  export maize. This was an in i t i a t ive  of 
primmy significance f o r  t:2s maize producer. But l e t  us now look a t  t-kte ww the maize 
trade worked. 
The most obvious f e a t u ~  o f  the m i z e  trade was the radical f luc twt ioa  i n  
prices over tiia a.m-iul cycle. Prices generally dropped sharply a t  harvesting time as  
the crop was marketed. The reasons f o r  th i s  precipitate offloading of the crop 
leadi-ng t o  gluts a d  p ~ o r  prices rsceived by ramem am not h a d  t o  d.iscover. The 
problem of sto.m(~e was a vepy important one. Heat, mois t~ae ,  f ros t  and pests a l l  
damslged stored gain. Weavils generally made the i r  appearance lay Noveaber, and. veryr 
few farnners had adequately insulated storage f a c t l i t i e s  , without wllicll maize very 
quickly became innsaleabls, so a t  the most famers  were able t o  %old 'back their crops 
fo r  only a few xonCils. But, given the lack of l iquid i ty  i n  the c u i t r y s i d e  and the 
fac t  that produce was ofteii Isonbd t o  the storekeeper i n  pa~nnezt of debts 101.4~ before 
it was harvested, few famers  indeed could hold back t h e i r  g m d ~ ~ c e  a f t e r  h .wes t ing  
f o r  any l e w h  of time a t  a l l .  Of c o m e ,  the more capitalized few wit11 sto~age. 
f a c i l i t i e s  and cash rssuwrces could play the market by holding p a i n  back un t i l  the 
price rose, but there were not many of t'nem. On the whole, farmers' costs w e r e  met 
by the extension of c redi t  i n  one f o m  o r  mother, and working capital  was kadeed 
tie*. This was the overriding factor  i n  deaying famers  any cotltml over m k e t i n g .  
This 0ve.r-supply i n  the months a f t e r  harmat  ,gx8dualTy gave way t o  hi&er 
prizes, and frequently the need t o  inpole film eve-mea. A fanner wrote i n  1913: "I 
have watched t h i s  maize market f o r  many years, ayld I see that m i z e  increases i n  
value quite 5% between harvest and the New Year regwlarly." (3)  So traders and 
wliolesalers able t o  s tore large quantities of grain were oftell able to  make 
considerable prof i t s  a t  the expense of fame-rs se l l ing  i n  an overloaded market. 
The dominant relationship of excharage i n  tine countryside was the cmdi t  and 
barter  system, which, although it  was und~ub.tedly breaking down i n  the early years of 
the centilry, was s t i l l  ceiit-ral i x  many faraerst l ives.  !??he system wlie'reby fanners 
would b q  supplies on long c:m.d.it md then pay off acc~unulated debts with prodince at  
harvest time severely res t r ic ted  the flow of oash within agcarian cmmmities. The 
i l l i qu id i ty  t rap also m e a t  that the dealer often bought produce froin farmers 3.
barker - by excl langi .~ produce f o r  s tore supplies. 
The storekeeper, like .the farmer, zlso had to -run the risk of having to 
dispose of grain in a chronically overloaded market. Rarely did a small-to9m 
storekeeper have adequate facilitiss for long-term storage. But,more imsortantly, 
they had insufficient liquid capital to sto.re grain for spes-ilative pwoses, awaitLng 
a rise in prices. They had to sell immediately in order to gay the farmer, if the 
farmer was to be paid in cash; or to replenish their stocks if, as was more likely, 
they had bought maize by barter, or received it in pcagnent of famem debts for store 
supplies previously sold on credit. This woxlil diminish the le~erage the storekeeper 
had in the market, for he would very likely find, tiia-i; his store stocks were deplstzd 
by the end of harvest, and had to sell his grain at wlmte~er pxke and in whate~er 
market he could. The result was that vexy often the inland dealer was campelled to 
sell on such terns as he could obtain fmm the big -in merchants, who we.= likely 
to take advantage of their felicitous positio~i by buying at low prices. Thus 
storekeepers relied on high turnover of prodi~ce for their profit. If they had to sell 
soon after harvest, when -the price was at its lowest, then what they lost in margin of 
profit they would have to gain on turnover. This situation was largely due to the 
credit and. barter system, which severely restricted the liquidity of agrarian commerce, 
and placed tight restrictions on the storekeeperfs cash resources. Inev2tably, the 
middleman profited at the famerfs expense, and the big middleman lorded it over the 
small dealer. 
These problems were well illustrated in 1909, a year in which %he maize crop 
was very large, and prices dropped dramatically with the harvest. Dealers in the 
northern districts of the ORC were "having to dispose of their grain for a mere song 
at the seaboard. Immense quantities of rnealies have been forwarded ... and yet neither 
the merchant nor the farner has been able to make any profit." The storekeepers were, 
in fact, out of pocket over the transactions. The coastal firms were selling in 
Europe at 12 to 13 shillings per bag, while the local consignor in Heilbron, say, was 
being paid 7/6, and the farmer who produced the grain even less. 
The ORC merchant thus being unable to get a fair price 
for the grain is naturally unable to pay the farmer a 
reasonable figure and the producer accordingly, whose 
interests should primarily be consulted, suffers and 
has to bear the brunt of this double system of 
middlemen. (4) 
Many storekeepers would try to break out of the illiquidity trap by entering 
into wfhtmes contractsn - selling maize which had not been harvested and which the3 
had not yet received, altho- it might be covered by debts owed by farmers. 
Nevertheless, many started on the brink of insolvency, thereby making contracts for 
the future delivery of produce which they had not yet bought, arad hoping to be able to 
buy at a cheaper price when the harvest came in than the price at which they had, in 
advance, sold. The wholesaler buying produce from a storekeeper did not know whether 
the latter had already bought the produce (or was .assured of receiving it in payment 
of debt), or, on the other hand, if he was speculating on being able to buy sufficient 
produce, and at a low enough price, in the future, to fulfil the contract. Thus the 
wholesalerfs own contracts were likely to be put at risk, since there was no guarantee 
of the financial status of the speculating storekeeper. (5) 
Quite apart, though, from the regular trader, intermittent da3bling in the 
produce market was undertaken by speculators, often unscmpulous and financially 
unsound men, operating on the brink of solvency. This activity was enomowly 
increased by the influx of small dealers with generous credit facilities into the 
country immediately after the war. As a result of the post-war depression and the 
consequent credit-squeeze and bankruptcies, many turned to speculation in livestock, 
maize, wool, whatever produce seemed suitable for profiteering at the time, playing 
the maxket in the hopes of small windfall gains. 
All this meant that wholesalers, who made their own fomrd contracts for 
supplying mills, municipalities or mininphouses, or for delivery to overseas buyers, 
were continually at risk of not being able to meet these contracts, owing to the 
failure of their own supplies to materialize. Inevitably, the small speculator, 
whether he be a storekeeper or simply a dabbler with an eye to a quick windfall, was 
a woefully insecure risk. The situation was aggravated by the notoriously misleading 
yield forecasts, which were likely to cause a great deal of commercial panic when the 
crop fell far short of expectations. The result of these risks was asl increase in 
the costs of the marketing system, for wholesalers natursallly expecte21 their profit 
margins to compensate for the risks involved. 
What commonly happened in the early years of the export trade was that far 
too large a proportion of the crop was sent overseas at -bhe beginning of the season, 
with the result that internal supplies dwindled to the point that prices had 
s-ocketed by Christmas. Over-exportation was largely due to bad crop-forecasting 
and consequent excessive speculation by export merchants on oversea markets. 'Phe 
selling of flfutureslf in Britain and Eumpe months in advance of harvest owing to the 
prospects of a heavy crop often meant a mad scramble to fulfil contracts when the 
crop twrned out to be much below expectations. !This kind of speculation was evident 
in the bumper year of 1909, But congestion at inlmd centres and a% the ports owing 
to the inability of the Conference lines steamers to handle the crop meant tkiat m a a y  
firms had difficulties in delivering contracts. The Director of Agriculture in the 
ORC noted "a mad scramble for maize before it is fully drys', which indicated that 
merchants had speculated on European markets in advance of %he crop, and that 
contmcts had now to be fulfilled. (6) 
As already indicated, bad crop-forecasting was an jmporta~..t factor in over- 
exportation. This consideration is well illustrated by the experience of 1908, By 
late November of that year maize was rising in price "with a mpidily meqw,lled in 
recent yearst1. Exports had depleted internal supplies owing to ovemstimating' of the 
year's maize yield, and underestimation of the extent of internal. demand. The demand 
for maize within South Africa had dramatically increased, owing mainly to the ravages 
of East Coast fever on plough oxen. !This was particularly felt in Zul.u9md, where 
the maize harvest was such that the inhabitants were thrown on to the market for food 
supplies as never before. The effects of dro-t had also 'been severely felt :in 
Basutolandl, where it was reported that cattle were being exchanged for maize, Of 
scarcely less significance was the replacement of the Chinese by maize-eating black 
labour on the Rand mines. By the end of November, the price of maize on the Rand had 
risen to 17 or 18 shillings, and it was predicted it would soon reach 20 shillings. 
By earu December, the mining companies were agitating for the removal of the import 
duty on maize. Before the end of the year, naany grain districts were having to 
import maize at excessive prices. (7) 
The year 1912 especially serves to illuminate many aspects of the marketing 
system. In February 1912, when the growing crop looked uncertain, Were was talk of 
-the possibility of enforced impor-tation in the near fuklnre, and a big rise in prices. 
However, a week or two later, excellent rains were reported fron the Highveid.: 7Pkmy 
who were pessimfstic a fortnight ago are inclined to look more favourably upon the 
possibilities." Famine prices would not, after all, prevail, ' k d  Durban fims are 
perfectly willing to back their belief in this by booking orders for maize to be 
delivered in June July at something under 11 shillingsqf. Simultaneously, the price 
started dropping, as speculators hastened to sell their grain. By early Maseh, the 
maize market at Durban was reported to be I1very weak with very few buyers. There has 
been a large amount on offer during last week, but very lit-kle business has been done. 
This state of affairs is said to be due to the very favourable crop reports.'"e 
speculators had overplayed their hand, had held on too long, and had been caught by 
favourable crop forecasts which caused the price to fall as exporters started entering 
contracts for future delivery from storekeepers and fanners. But, contrary to 
expectations and forecasts, the crop was indeed a poor one. By late September, the 
market was feeling the squeeze; at Durban the price had risen to above European prices, 
making further export contracts unprofitable. Holders of maize were "asking a price 
which prevents big business going through. A few hundred here and there change hands 
at figures much above what was anticipated for this time of year." The rush to enter 
contracts for export and the consequent depletion of intern1 supplies had once again 
proved disastrous. By mid-December, the Durban price had reached £1 per bag. A firm 
of produce-brokers in that town could not recall ''any year in which mealies have risen 
10 shillings a bag during the months of September, October and Novemberf1. (8) 
The overestimation of the crop, the selling of futures contracts overseas 
in excess of what the yield warranted, and consequent over-exportation, could also 
result in South African maize being re-exported from Europe to South Africa at a 
considerable profit to the European bnporters. !Phis happened in 1905, and -in in 
1912. In October 1912, for exanple, a firm sent from Durban to Antwerp a shipment of 
10,000 bags, which was sold for 12/6 per bag. No sooner had the sale been concluded 
than the chronic shortage and high price inside South APtica induced the Antwerp bqrers 
to reconsign the entire cargo back to its port of origin withol~t even offloading it. 
Thus, by the end of November 19x2, it was back in Durban, where it was sold at ~ 6 / 6  
per bag. A11 in all, 28,000 ba.gs of South African maize were reimported thm- 
Durban alone. (9) 
By the end of January 1913, white flat maize was selling in Durban for 24/6 
despite these reimportations. This shortage was at least partlr due, inevitably, to 
the activities of the speculators. It had become clear that "fairly large stocks of 
mealies are being held, for it is impossible to account for the disappearance of last 
seasonvs crop". (10) Nevertheless, large-scale inportation from the Argentine caused 
a considerable easing in the market by mid-lvIarch, which meant that speculators were 
"obliged to retire from the arena". m e  significance of the marketing year 1912-13 
was summed up by a correspondent. If reliable statistics of yields had been available, 
"we should not be in the ridiculous position of exporting mealies at 8 to 10 shillings 
per muid and importing the sane mealies at an advance of nearly 100/o". (11) 
Inevitably in such years, an agitation went up for the suspension of customs 
duties a& preferential rail rates in order to facilitate the irzpor-bation of maize 
once the internal supplies started dwi~rCiing and prices risirq. It is revealing as to 
the influence of specula,tors that when, in November 1912, there was a real poscibility 
of the government acceding to such solicitations, the prospect of cheaper imports 
frightened speculators to the tune or" a drop in the maize price of a shilling. Within 
a few days of General. Both announcing that no suspension of the tariff was envisaged, 
the price rose again by Yd. 
The phenomenon of over-exportation was not only due to overestimation of the 
crop an6 excessive speculation overseas by exporters in advance of hamest. The major 
anomaly of export subsidisation was that it became relatively cheaper and more 
profitable to export maize overseas tlm to rail it to conswoing centres within South 
Africa. The cost of internal transport retarded distribution of produce from 
producing to non-producing regions. It seemed to many at the tine ~atisfactoqy that, 
while shiploads of maize were being sent to Europe, cargoes were being hpor"ced into 
South Africa from South America to supply -the non-pro&wing parts of the Cape, !This 
situation was the result of hi& irland rail rates, colpbined with the cheap export 
rate introduced precisely in order to secure a viable and profitable market for the 
farmer. It was much cheaper to send maize to, say, Port Elizabeth for export than to 
send it there for local consupption. Naize from the Free State woad be sent to Dwban 
by rail,md thenby stemer to Cape Tom, where it was distributed to inl.md areas where 
demand existed. This roundabout journey was cheaper than rail transport o~erland. 
The result was that maize coat more in the Cape than it did in Europe - 15 or 16 
shillings a bag. It was also an expensive undertaking to transport, for example, maize 
from an arable district to a pastoral one where it could be fed to stock. (Fhus, the 
rating structure "led to the unsound position under which South Africa exported its 
maize oversea and pmchased it back, at hi& figures, in the shape of bacon, ham, 
butter, cheese and meat". (12) 
Thus, the initial euphoria induced by officials and merchants alike over the 
exciting potential of export markets for maize was not universal, a;nd a backlash 
eventually set in. It was the severe drough-b of 1912, with its devastating effects on 
the stock population, that most dramatically inspired a reappraisal of the invariable 
beneficence of maize exportation. In that year it was quite common for farmers to 
sell their maize at harvest-time for ten shillings, and to buy it back again for 15 
shillings in October as %he drought made itself felt. A correspondent in the Farmers' 
Advocate in December 1912 was speaking for m a n y  when he wondered "why the exportation 
of pain is not made positively illegal in view of the pitiable shortage which has 
overtaken us ... Instead of which our farmers are offered every facility to cart our 
grain out of the country". (13) And, indeed, given the necessary capital and 
infrastrmctural resources, the returm the farmer might get if he we= in a position 
to concentrate to a water extent on using maize as a stock-feed, and produci~lg meat 
and dairy products for internal (and external) markets, was considerably greater than 
he got from exporting his crop. 
As we have seen, the high intemal railway rates, coupled with the low 
export rates, were in part responsible for the neglect of these considerations and 
the eve-emphasis on exportation. Crucial in correcting the imbalance was the freight 
reduction of October 1911, when it was laid down-that a maximum flat rate for the 
carriage of South African grain and forage was to operate between any two stations of 
the South African Railways. As an example of the effect the reduction had: at Graaff- 
Reinet in the Cape Province maize was fetching l?/- a bag before the new flat rate was 
introduced; as a result of the new rate, a Highveld famer was able to send 1,000 
bags from his farm direct to Graaff-Reinet by rail, instead of shippirg the cargo to 
Cape Town first, as had previously been the case, and the price of a bag in Graaf- 
Reinet immediately fell to 12 shillings, while the famer made a Setter profit on his 
produce. Thus both producer and consumer benefited substantialZy. (14) I 
I 
The new rates promised to open up large and previously inaccessible internal 
markets for the South African producer. The greatest stmctural obstacles to more 
capitalized farming could be eased only by the readier and cheaper access to railway 
transport. In particular, the new flat rate of 1911 wodd assist fanners in 
supplying internal markets with animal products, since only by the easy distribution 
of stock-feed aYld forage crops, especially maize, could supplies of cream to I 
dairies and fatstock to butchers be maintained. thxougbotzt the year, m d  not only at 
favourable seasons. Once it had become as economical for a mize farmer to send his 
maize to a non-arable district as it was to send it to Durban for export, a major 
obstacle to the progress of pastoral production had been removed. 
As a result of a number of such new factors. 1913 is another year Which would 
repay investigation, for it illuminated how the variables in the mrketing system could 
operate in a different way. Because of the experiences of previous years, farmers in 
that year held back their crops from the market in unprecedented numbers, paxtly to 
guard against drought but also in the hope that they would benefit by a rise in price. 
In 1913, too, the crop was unexpectedly large in comparison with expecta,tions. The 
underestimate of the total crop - contrary to the consisLent overestimation of 
previous seasons - led fanners and traders to believe that the price would rise 
rapidly, and they would gain by holding back awhile. 
The effect of the reluctance to sell was that the internal price remained 
firm in the months immediately after harvest. This meant that exportation was not as 
profitable to coastal wholesalers in 1913 as it normally had been. The general 
disillusionment with maize exportation owing to the effects of drowt, cheaper 
distribution within South Africa, the consequences of over-exportation in previous 
gears, and the relatively high internal prices ruling: together these factors put a 
damper on the export trade. Towards the end of 1913, however, when holders started 
selling, and the extent of the crop became apparent, the price suddenly dropped. This 
in turn belatedly provoked an eqort drive, for the drop in the intern1 price meant 
healthy profits for exporters, However, by the time holders of maize generally started 
selling, it was in many cases too late, for the maize had deteriorated badly in 
quality. This was inevitable when those without adequate storage facilities tried to 
speculate by holding grain back from the market. (15) 
But there was s~lrely another new factor in play here. The capacity of 
fanners and inland produce dealers to hold back grain probably demonstrated a rapid 
breaking-dawn of the barter and credit system, much greater liquidity and working 
capit& in agrarian codties, and greater access to credit, in the post-Union years. 
This was particularly the case in arable districts opened up by railways, and was 
l 
evidenced by the startling advance in land prices. 
The experience of 1920 demonstrates clearly the farmerls greater freedom 
from the illiquidity trap. Again, as in 1913, crop forecasts fell far short of the 
actual yield, and the consequences were similar to those of 1913. In 1920, farmersf 
detemination to hold back in anticipation of sharply rising prices led to meetings 
in the maize districts at wkich selling prices of between 25 aYld 30 shillings per bag 
were agreed to, and fanners undertook to refrain from sellire until such price levels 
had been reached. However, the merchants then turned to Rhodesia, and met local 
demand by importing about 700,000 bags from north of the Limpopo. Tnevitably, the 
price of maize rapidly declined when the extent of the crop became apparent, a d  the 
bulk of the crop was sold at practically half the figure which could have been 
obtained in the earlier part of the marketing season. This pattern is reflected in 
the export figures : of 2,689,142 bags of maize and maize meal exported in 1920-21, 
2,171,912 bags were shipped from January to June 1921. (16) 
Undoubtedly, the introduction of the elevator system in the mid-1920s 
revolutionized maize marketing. It provided for bulk Wdling, sorting arad grading 
at depots in the maize districts themselves; eliminated the small trader; reduced 
the risk of deterioration of quality in storage; and greatly facilitated 
transportation. Thus much of the risk and uncertainty involved in the marketing of 
grain was eliminated. So, what we have been looking at is essentially a system in 
transition - the unfettered competitive stage in the eEergence of a capitalist 
agricul turn. 
----ooo-."-- 
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